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Detailed  examination  of  the  criticisms  of  the  J-value  put forward  by  Jones-Lee  and  Chilton  shows  their
points  to be  without  merit.  However,  the exercise  of  refuting  their critique  has  brought  out  a  number
of  J-value  implications  of  potential  interest  and  value  to  engineering  professionals  seeking  to  ﬁnd  the
objectively  reasonable  amount  that ought  to be spent  on a  safety  system.  The  paper  applies  the  J-value  to
the  example  of  a long-term  protection  system  on a notional  major-hazard  process  plant,  where  a  severe
accident  would  otherwise  pose  a  risk of  death  to  the  general  public  either  immediately  or in the shorteywords:
-value
isk
mmediate hazard
PF
afety
term.  Equations  are  developed  for the improvement  in  life  expectancy  produced  by averting  such  an
industrial  hazard  over  a prolonged  period.  The  opportunity  is  taken  to review  the  developments  in the
J-value that  have  taken  place  over the  12  years  since  the  ﬁrst  paper  on  the  method  appeared  in  Process
Safety  and  Environmental  Protection.
©  2019  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  on  behalf  of  Institution  of  Chemical  Engineers.
afety fallacies
. Introduction
The J-value method (J for judgement), ﬁrst introduced in Process
afety and Environmental Protection in 2006 (Thomas et al., 2006a,
,c), estimates the maximum it is reasonable to spend on a safety
easure or system by balancing the safety expenditure against the
ncrease life expectancy it brings about. At its core is the concept of
he life-quality index (LQI), which is an increasing function of both
ife expectancy and annual utility, with risk-aversion used to con-
ert monetary income to utility – the satisfaction that the money
rings (Nathwani et al., 1997; Pandey and Nathwani, 2003; Pandey
t al., 2006; Nathwani et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2006a, 2010a). The
aximum reasonable expenditure will have been reached when
he increase in the LQI due to the greater life expectancy the safety
easure confers is just matched by the decrease in life quality
ssociated with the fall in income incurred by paying for it.
The J-value, J, is found by dividing the actual cost of the safety
easure by the maximum reasonable just found. The starting point
or the safety decision is that resources should not be commit-
ed in the way proposed if J exceeds 1.0. On the other hand the
xpenditure will be deemed justiﬁable if J ≤ 1.0.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: philip.thomas@bristol.ac.uk (P. Thomas).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2019.04.003
957-5820/© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical EngineeThe J-value method is based on actuarial and economic mea-
surements and is fully objective. Importantly, it has been validated
against extensive empirical data (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a;
Thomas, 2017a).
The objective and validated status of the J-value for assessing
the worth of life-extending measures sets it apart from the v¨alue
of a prevented fatality(¨VPF), a method that has now lost credibility.
The ﬁgure for the UK VPF was derived from a survey of the opin-
ions of a small sample of people (167) carried out in 1997 (Carthy
et al., 1999). The investigators interpreted their survey using a
technique of their own  devising, namely the two-injury chained
method. Wolff and Orr later commented on this procedure (Wolff
and Orr, 2009, Appendix 1, Section A.1B):
t¨he testing of any such assumption, and hence the validation of
the method, presents severe challenges. . . . In short, if it were
possible to validate the chained method, it would not be neces-
sary."
In fact, the surveyors’ own  data show the two-injury chained
method to be invalid (Thomas and Vaughan (2015a)) so that the
UK VPF is left without a basis in evidence. The UK Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) has been made aware of the problem (Thomas,
2018a), which removes one of the pillars on which safety assess-
ments are made in the UK.
The opinion surveyors have attempted to defend their ﬁndings
(Chilton et al., 2015), but their points have been refuted (Thomas
rs.
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t ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that the former gives a superior increase in
life expectancy. They then suggest that the J-value would favour10 P. Thomas, I. Waddington / Process Safety an
nd Vaughan, 2015b). Two of the surveyors, Jones-Lee and Loomes
2015) essayed a second attempt, but Thomas and Vaughan (2015c)
nswered their points, concluding:
T¨he salient fact is that the VPF derived from the two-injury
chained method has been shown to be unsubstantiated and it is
wholly unsatisfactory that it should be used as a benchmark for
safety investment in the UK. We  stand by our previous conclu-
sion (Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a) that there is a need for active
consideration of methods of valuing human life in the UK that
offer an alternative to stated preference techniques. Ensuring
that UK workers and public receive adequate protection from
industrial and transport hazards means that a re-appraisal is
needed urgently of other statistical methodologies that can pro-
vide guidance to owners, operators and regulators on decisions
on safety."
While Thomas and Vaughan (2015a) provide a comprehensive
nalysis of the legion of problems besetting the UK VPF, a shorter,
asy-to-read commentary on its ﬂaws is given in Thomas and
addington (2017b).
Owners, operators and regulators seeking guidance for decisions
n safety now have the objective and validated J-value method
vailable to them. The J-value has been documented in over 40 pub-
ished papers (www.jvalue.co.uk) since the original article (Thomas
t al., 2006a) appeared in Process Safety and Environmental Protec-
ion (PSEP). The NREFS study (NREFS, 2017), which explored how
est to cope after a big nuclear accident, used the J-value as one
f its core techniques. Three independent methods were employed
n that multi-university project, and each pointed to the important
olicy conclusion that mass relocation of people should be used
paringly if at all, even after a very severe nuclear reactor accident
uch as Chernobyl or Fukushima Daiichi (Thomas and May, 2017).
It is striking that, despite the very large number of learned-
ournal papers concerning the J-value published over the years, no
omment critical of the J-value appeared in the refereed literature
n the ﬁrst decade after the ﬁrst article appeared. During that time,
he only negative commentary of which we are aware was  a review
upplied to the Nuclear Division of the Health and Safety Executive
y Spackman (2009). Spackman made it clear in his report that
e was ﬁrmly committed to the UK VPF, a position he reafﬁrmed
fterwards (Spackman et al., 2011). Public comment on his report
ecame possible after it was published openly 2 years later, which
ed, after correspondence with the Ofﬁce for Nuclear Regulation
Ofﬁce of Nuclear Regulation (ONR, 2011a, b), to the publication of
omprehensive rebuttals from Lind (2011) and from Thomas and
ones (2011). The latter concluded:
S¨packman’s review provides a welcome stimulus to discussion
on the J-value. However, it suffers from serious omissions and
contains inconsistencies, ﬂaws, and disagreements with main-
stream economic thinking. In addition, it appears to suggest
a bias against innovation, which may  act against the overall
imperative to ensure that safety related expenditure decisions
are rationally and objectively based. It is concluded that the
review’s multiple deﬁciencies rule it out as a basis for judgement
on the merits or otherwise of the J-value framework."
The tendency to reject novelty identiﬁed by Thomas and
ones (2011) would appear to be conﬁrmed by the publica-
ion 3 years later of Spackman’s F¨inal comment on the J-value
pproach(¨Spackman, 2014), which includes as its 3rd-last sen-
ence:A¨s a valuation method it [the J-value] is much less plausible than
those established and developed over recent decades."ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
viz. the small-scale opinion surveys carried out by Jones-Lee and
Chilton in the 1990s (Beattie et al., 1998; Carthy et al., 1999).
But now, for the ﬁrst time to our knowledge, an article criticising
the J-value has appeared in the open, refereed literature (Jones-
Lee and Chilton, 2017). It may  be noted that Jones-Lee and Chilton
are authors of the discredited two-injury chained method used in
deriving the UK VPF, and Jones-Lee shares an enthusiasm for the
VPF with Spackman, his co-author on several studies (Jones-Lee
et al., 2007; Spackman et al., 2011; Jones-Lee and Spackman, 2013).
We welcome the contribution of Jones-Lee and Chilton to the
public debate on how best to value safety measures. However, the
criticisms they put forward appear to be based on fallacious mis-
understandings of the J-value, and it is in the public interest that
those fallacies should be explored and rebutted.
The paper’s format has been chosen to bring out clearly a num-
ber of implications of the J-value that are likely to be of interest
to users of the method and more generally. To aid readers in their
understanding of the issues discussed, a worked example is given
for a notional major hazard process plant. The scientiﬁc arguments
are presented in Section 2, which takes the form of a distillation
of the points contained in Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s 2017 paper,
followed in each case by a refutation. A discussion will follow in
Section 3 and conclusions in Section 4.
As observed above, the comments by Jones-Lee and Chilton
concern the earliest J-value paper (Thomas et al., 2006a) and so
Appendix A has been included to trace the evolution of the LQI
used in the J-value over the intervening 12 years. Then Appendix B
explains how the J-value is found from the LQI. Appendix C shows
the inappropriateness of the harmonic mean that Jones-Lee and
Chilton propose for ﬁnding the arithmetic mean of a ratio. Appendix
D contains a worked example of a plant falling into the COMAH
(Control of Major Accident Hazard) category, and this might use-
fully be read in advance of Section 2. Appendix E derives, for a
prolonged, uniform reduction in the hazard rate, the increase in
life expectancy for those in the protected group living at the time
the safety measure is introduced. Appendix F derives an equivalent
expression for those born into the protected group during the time
the safety system is in service. Finally, Appendix G addresses the
deﬁciencies in the argument advanced by Jones-Lee and Chilton
against the Total Judgement or JT-value in the last paragraph of
their Section 5.
2. Fallacies and refutations
2.1. Fallacy 1: that the J-value should be regarded as invalid if
more life extension is gained by a later, very large reduction in the
hazard rate than by a much smaller reduction in risk now
2.1.1. Summary
Jones-Lee and Chilton invite the reader to regard a hazard reduc-
tion of 6 × 10−4 over one year for a 40-year-old and a hazard
reduction of 240 × 10−4 over 12 months for an 80-year-old as
equivalent, despite the second reduction being 40 times greater.
The suggestion may  represent a departure from common sense
– why  should anyone think that very dissimilar risk reductions
ought to be regarded as comparable? – but it constitutes the
p¨rincipalc¨omponent of Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s case against the
J-value.
Having arranged for the risk reduction offered at age 80 to be a
great deal larger than that offered at age 40, Jones-Lee and Chiltonthe offer at age 80 over that available at age 40. This is entirely
incorrect.
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In fact, Jones-Lee and Chilton commit the elementary economic
lunder of ignoring the cost side of the cost-beneﬁt balance. Remov-
ng a 40 times bigger risk will actually cost a lot more. This will
ender the J-value for the immediate offer to the 40-year-old sig-
iﬁcantly lower than the J-value for the risk reduction offered at a
ater age. Hence not only would the J-value favour immediate risk
eduction if the reduction were to be the same at age 80 as at age
0, but the J-value would also favour immediate risk reduction in
he case proposed by Jones-Lee and Chilton, where those authors
hose the later risk reduction to be hugely greater.
What the J-value would recommend can thus be seen to be the
xact opposite of what Jones-Lee and Chilton allege.
.1.2. Detailed analysis
The main aim of Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s paper is set out in the
oncluding two sentences of their Section 1:
A¨lthough Spackman does not spell this out, one such factor is
clearly the nature of the small change in the survival function
that gives rise to the change in life expectancy. The principal
purpose of this paper is to deal in more detail with this particular
limitation of the J-value model . . ."
This p¨rincipal purposei¨s then picked up in Section 3, where the
laim is made, in paragraph 2, that the J-value is
i¨ncapable of taking account of the fact that a given gain in life
expectancy can, in principle, be generated by any one of a vari-
ety of different types of perturbation, or very small changes, in
an individual’s survival function (or, equivalently, her vector of
future hazard rates)"
This is a puzzling statement. It is well known that the life
xpectancy, X (a),  at age, a, is the integral over all future ages, of
he survival probabilities, S ( t| a), to age, t, given that age, a, has
een reached and that, moreover, these survival probabilities will
epend on the integral of the hazard rate, h (u),  for future years, u.
hus
(a) =
∞∫
t=a
S ( t| a)dt =
∞∫
t=a
e
−
t∫
u=a
h(u)du
dt (1)
ee, for example, Marshall et al. (1983). Meanwhile a life extending
easure will lead to a reduction in hazard rate, b (u),  which can be
n force for many years, during which the hazard reduction may
ary with time. Life expectancy will then increase to:
′ (a) =
∞∫
t=a
S′ ( t| a)dt =
∞∫
t=a
e
−
t∫
u=a
(h(u)−b(u))du
dt (2)
he gain in life expectancy may  then be found by subtraction.
It is not clear what point Jones-Lee and Chilton were hoping
o make in the second claim cited above, but Eq. (2), used in J-
alue analysis, demonstrates that the statement is clearly untrue.
-value calculations can be carried out for any small variation toironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 311
the hazard rate, including a time-varying perturbation that lasts
for a prolonged period. This feature of J-value analysis, which is
explained in more detail in Section 2.4, allows an objective assess-
ment to be made of the economic worth of a safety measure or
a protection system guarding against any time-proﬁle of hazard
to human life. A recent example is the evaluation of the recom-
mendations to relocate for people living near the power plants
after the big nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-
ichi (Waddington et al., 2017). Here the J-value analysis was  able
to account for a time-varying radiation hazard that took 70 years
to decay to a low level.
Jones-Lee and Chilton attempt to clarify their position by devot-
ing their next paragraph to a hypothetical game (which they make
no attempt to relate to reality):
T¨hus, for example, consider a situation in which an individual
aged 40 is informed that in the UK for a person of his/her age
the probability of death during the coming year is about 14 in
10,000, while if he/she were to survive to the age of 80 the proba-
bility of death during the coming year would rise to roughly 660
in 10,000. Suppose that the individual is then asked which of the
two  risks he/she would prefer to have halved. In spite of the fact
that the probability of the 40-year old surviving to age 80 is only
about 0.63, his/her gain in undiscounted life expectancy result-
ing from a halving of the hazard rate at age 80 would actually
be about six times larger than the gain resulting from a halving
of the risk of death during the coming year"
[The italics are those of Jones-Lee and Chilton.]
No algebra is provided by Jones-Lee and Chilton to justify the
point being made, but it is desirable, in the interests of fairness,
that the reader should understand their various claims in sufﬁcient
detail to be able to judge them. Therefore we  offer the following
explanation of the route that presumably those authors took to
arrive at their ﬁgures.
Suppose that the hazard rate at age, a, is subject to a uniform
reduction over a period of one year, so that the perturbation to the
hazard rate takes the form:
b (u) =
{
b fora < u ≤ a + 1
0 foru > a + 1 (3)
where b (u) depends on age, u, while b on its own is independent
of u.
[The stipulation by Jones-Lee and Chilton of a duration of one
year seems to arise because of those authors’ promotion of the mis-
taken view that it is invalid to calculate the gain in life expectancy
that a protection system will bring except over the coming year:
i¨t is necessary to ensure that the gains in life expectancy being
valued are the result of reductions in the risk of death during
the coming year, rather than delayed risk reductions that will
be effective only in later years of life"
Paragraph 4 of Section 1 of Jones-Lee and Chilton (2017).
While, as will now be shown, the gain in life expectancy can be
estimated in a particularly simple way  when the hazard is reduced
for just one year, it is eminently possible to ﬁnd the change in life
expectancy when the reduction in hazard rate persists over many
years. See Section 2.4.]
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Table 1
Parameters based on National Life Tables 2014–2016, combined genders.
Age, a Life expectancy„
at age, a
Survival
probability„ to
age, a
Hazard rate„ at
age a
40 42.03 0.9809 1.247×10−3
80 8.92 0.6203 4.881×10−212 P. Thomas, I. Waddington / Process Safety an
Substituting from Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) gives the increased life
xpectancy at age, a, as:
X ′ (a) =
∞∫
t=a
e
−
t∫
u=a
(h (u) − b (u))du
dt =
∞∫
a
e
a+1∫
a
bdu −
t∫
a
h (u)du
dt
=
∞∫
a
ebe
−
t∫
a
h (u)du
dt
=  eb
∞∫
a
e
−
t∫
a
h (u)du
dt = ebX (a) ≈ (1  + b)X (a)
(4)
here the last step has used the expansion, ex = 1 + x + x22! + x
3
3! +
.., truncated after the ﬁrst two terms, a reasonable approximation
hen x is small. Subtracting the original life expectancy at age a,
(a), then gives the change as:
ıX (a) = X ′ (a) − X (a)
≈ bX (a) (5)
It will be shown in Section 2.2 that Jones-Lee and Chilton are
ncorrect to assume that the J-value should apply to individuals
ithin the group to be protected rather than to the group as a whole.
owever we can get around this point for the present purposes by
ssuming that the population to be protected consists of a group
f individuals of the same age, or else by making the assumption
he group consists of a single member of age 40. Adopting the sec-
nd course, let us imagine that the sole member of the group, an
ndividual of age 40 is offered the choice between a reduction in
azard rate over the coming year and a similar reduction over 12
onths in 40 years’ time, if and when he/she has attained the age
f 80. Continuing this line of thought, it is possible to use Eq. (5) to
alculate the change in life expectancy for the individual of age 40
s
X (40) ≈  bX (40) (6)
Considering life expectancy at age 80, if the individual dies
efore the age of 80, he/she will experience no change in life
xpectancy at that age. On the other hand, if he/she lives to 80,
e/she will gain ∼bX (80) in  life expectancy. The chance of the latter
ain in life expectancy being achieved is the probability of living to
ge 80 given survival to age 40, namely S
(
80
∣∣40) = S (80)/S (40),
he right-hand side of which equality comprises the ratio of the
urvival probabilities to ages 80 and 40 respectively. Hence the
xpected value, ıX
(
80
∣∣40), of the gain in life at age 80 result-
ng from a year’s reduction in hazard 40 years from now for the
ndividual currently aged, 40, may  be written:
ıX
(
80
∣∣40) ≈ S (80∣∣40)× bX (80) + (1 − S (80∣∣40))× 0
≈ S (80)
S (40)
×  bX (80)
(7)
It is, of course, possible to generalise Eq. (7) for any t : t ≥ 40 to
ive the improvement in life expectancy for a reduction, b, in the
azard rate occurring at later age, t:X ( t|40) ≈  S ( t|40) × bX (t) (8)
If we follow Jones-Lee and Chilton and assume that b is 50%
f the background hazard rate at age 40, then we may  calculate
 as: 12 × 1.247 × 10−4 = 6.24 × 10−4. On inserting this ﬁgure intoFig. 1. Improvement in life expectancy for a 40 year old when the hazard rate is
reduced for one year at a later age by the same amount, b = 6.24 × 10−4, equivalent
to  50% of the background hazard rate for a 40 year old UK citizen.
Eq. (8), and using the values for S (40),  S (80) and X (80) given in
Table 1, the resulting changes in life expectancy may  be calculated
as
ıX (40) =  0.026 y = 9.57 days
ıX
(
80
∣∣40) = 0.0035 y = 1.29 days (9)
[Jones-Lee and Chilton do not specify a life table to which they
applied their method, saying only that T¨hese are the approximate
UK hazard rates averaged over males and females(¨their end-note 7).
In the interests of accuracy, consistency and traceability, actuarial
ﬁgures used in this paper will be based on combined gender data
from the most recent life tables (2014–2016) available for the UK
at the time of writing (Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2017)].
Applying Eq. (8) to all ages up to 100 results in Fig. 1, which
shows that the gain in life expectancy falls roughly linearly with
age, and that the gains decline to nearly zero for future ages in
excess of about 90 years.
Inspection of the falling curve of Fig. 1 prompts the question:
how was  it that Jones-Lee and Chilton managed to suggest that the
improvement in life expectancy for implementation of the health
and safety measure 40 years later at 80 rather than now, at age, 40,
could be "six times larger"  (their italics)?The trick is to multiply the hazard reduction offered at age 40
by a very large factor prior to making the proposal for age 80. No
explicit justiﬁcation is given by Jones-Lee and Chilton for reduc-
ing the hazard tens of times more at age 80 than at age 40. While
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he statement is made that the background hazard rate is reduced
y 50% at each age, no attempt is made to explain why this much
reater reduction in hazard rate at age 80 should be regarded as
omparable with the smaller decrease at age 40.
It will, of course, be evident even to the casual reader that the
ackground hazard rate for a person of 80 must be very much
igher than that facing a person of 40 simply because of the nat-
ral effects of old age. But why should this disparity be reﬂected
n the offers made? In fact, Jones-Lee and Chilton suggest the ratio
f hazard reductions should be 660 × 10−4/14 × 10−4 ≈ 47, so that
he reduction in hazard offered at age 80 is nearly 50 times higher
han the reduction at age 40. The actuarial ﬁgures for 2014–2016
uggest that the background hazard rates are 12.47 in 10,000 at age
0 and 488 in 10,000 at age 80, which imply a slightly lower but
till very high ratio, viz.  488 × 10−4/12.47 × 10−4 ≈ 39.
Reductions in hazard rate of b = 6.24 × 10−4 at age 40, and a 39
imes greater ﬁgure at age 80, namely b = 244 × 10−4, produce the
ollowing expected values:
ıX (40) =  0.026 y
= 9.57 days
(
as before withb = 6.24 × 10−4
)
ıX
(
80
∣∣40) = 0.137 y
= 50.2 days
(
where the previous value ofb has been
multiplied by 39 : b = 244 × 10−4
) (10)
The ﬁrst ﬁgure, 9.57 days, is similar to that quoted by Jones-
ee and Chilton (0.028 y = 10.2 days), while the second is a little
ess than their ﬁgure of 0.166 y = 60.6 days. Nevertheless equa-
ion set (10) reproduces a substantially higher improvement in life
xpectancy at age 80 than at age 40, as reported by Jones-Lee and
hilton (2017). At this point those authors assert that
a¨ccording to the J-value model, the individual would express a
clear preference for the delayed risk reduction."
hich claim they assert as evidence for a "fundamental conceptual
imitation" in the J-value.
To be clear, what Jones-Lee and Chilton are alleging is that the
0 year old, guided by the J-value, would reject a reduction in haz-
rd now in favour of a 39 times greater reduction in risk in 40 years’
ime if and when he/she has reached the age of 80. Patently, Jones-
ee and Chilton have provided a huge (and unexplained) weighting
o make the later hazard reduction look more attractive. But it turns
ut that, even so, the allegation that the J-value would favour the
elayed reduction in risk is false.
Jones-Lee and Chilton do not present a J-value calculation to
ack up their assertion. But clearly it is only by so doing that an
ssessment can be made of the relative worth of the increases in
ife expectancy given in equation set (10), as measured by the J-
alue. So let us now use the J-value to examine Jones-Lee’s and
hilton’s rather bold claim.
The general equation for the J-value is derived in Appendix B as
q. (B.4), repeated below for the convenience of the reader
 = 1 − ε
G
ıGˆ
X
ıX
(B.4)
here ε is the risk-aversion, G is the gross domestic product (GDP)
er head, ıGˆ is the annual cost of the protection measure per pro-
ected person, X is the life expectancy of the population group under
onsideration and ıX is the improvement in life expectancy brought
bout by the safety measure. Suppose that the annual cost of the
ealth and safety measure needed to reduce the hazard rate by
 = 6.24 × 10−4 is ıGˆ . The J-value, J , associated with applying this1 1
azard rate reduction at age 40, is:
1 =
1 − ε
G
X (40) ıGˆ1
1
ıX (40)
(11)ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 313
Similarly, the J-value, J2, associated with applying the hazard
rate reduction, at age 80 will be
J2 =
1 − ε
G
X (40) ıGˆ2
1
ıX
(
80
∣∣40) (12)
where ıGˆ2 is the annual cost per protected person of the health and
safety measure needed to reduce the hazard rate by b = 244 × 10−4
and X (40) is  retained in Eq. (12) because it is the 40 year old who
is taking the decision.
Knowledge of the relationship between ıGˆ1 and ıGˆ2, would give
us an idea of how to assess the two proposals by applying the J-
value.
It is clear that reducing the background hazard rate by as much
as 50% for a 40 year old is likely to be difﬁcult. It might involve, for
example, isolating that person from accident hazards and sources
of infection, while providing the highest level of medical care on
immediate call and perhaps instituting a suicide watch. But reduc-
ing the background hazard rate for the 80 year old by the far greater
amount needed to halve his/her hazard rate would obviously be a
signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult undertaking, simply because so much
of the hazard faced by an 80 year old is associated with old age and
so intrinsic and very difﬁcult to inﬂuence.
In reality, achieving the greater reduction in hazard rate speci-
ﬁed for the 80 year old is likely to be impossible, and our best model
is then to assign an inﬁnite cost to the process: ıGˆ2 → ∞.  This would
imply, from Eq. (12), that the J-value for this option, J2, would tend
to inﬁnity. This would mean that the alternative choice of an imme-
diate reduction in hazard rate at age 40 would be preferable for any
ﬁnite value of implementation cost, ıGˆ1.
At the very least, the law of diminishing returns would surely
be a large factor in the cost of the very great reduction in hazard
rate speciﬁed for the 80 year old. But, in a spirit of indulgence, let
us assume that ıGˆ2 remains ﬁnite and that, moreover, cost is pro-
portional to the reduction in hazard rate. Under this assumption,
ıGˆ2
ıGˆ1
= b2
b1
(13)
where b1 = 6.24 × 10−4 is the hazard reduction offered at age 40
and b2 = 244 × 10−4 is the hazard reduction offered at age 80.
Let us now assume further that the proposition to the 40 year
old is that the reduction in hazard rate 40 years later at the age of
80 is to be accompanied by an offer to discount back to today the
cost of the later reduction using the social discount rate. Using the
results of Thomas and Waddington (2017a), this can be estimated
as the growth in GDP per head, found to be 2.03% per annum for
the UK for the period 1961–2013 (World Bank, 2017). Hence ıGˆ2 in
Eq. (12) is replaced by a lower, discounted version, ıGˆ2d. This will
tend to increase the attraction of the delayed version.
When this is all done, the ratio of the J-values may  be found by
dividing Eq. (12) by Eq. (11):
J2
J1
= ıGˆ2
ıGˆ1
ıX(40)
ıX(80|40) = (
1
1 + r∗ )
40 ıGˆ2
ıGˆ1
ıX(40)
ıX(80|40)
= ( 1
1 + r∗ )
40 b2
b1
ıX(40)
ıX(80|40) ≈  (
1
1 + r∗ )
40 b2
b1
S(40)
S(80)
b1X(40)
b2X(80)
≈ ( 1
1 + r∗ )
40 S(40)
S(80)
X(40)
X(80)
≈ ( 1
1.0203
)
40
× 0.9809
0.6203
× 42.03
8.92
= 3.33
(14)
where discounting at the social discount rate, r∗, is applied to ıGˆ2
in the second step, Eq. (13) is used in the third and Eq. (8) in the
fourth.
Based on this J-value analysis and making generous conces-
sions to boost the attractiveness of delaying the risk reduction,
the option of taking the immediate reduction in hazard rate at age
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0 still emerges as over three times as cost-beneﬁcial. For exam-
le, if the J-value at age 40 were unity, the individual might well
ecide to accept that option while, by the same token, rejecting the
isk-reduction scheme to be applied at age 80 as over 3 times too
xpensive because J = 3.33.
Clearly Jones-Lee and Chilton are entirely wrong to suggest that
he J-value would favour choosing the delayed option. They have
ommitted the elementary economic error of paying no attention
o the cost side of the cost-beneﬁt equation.
Moreover, while those authors took pains to offer in their hypo-
hetical game a much greater reduction in hazard rate at age 80 than
t age 40, in fact this boosting of the beneﬁts of the delayed option
s a matter of no consequence. Inspection of Eq. (14) shows that,
hen the cost of the beneﬁt is taken, generously to the Jones-Lee
nd Chilton argument, to be proportional to the size of the hazard
eduction, the degree by which the hazard is reduced has no inﬂu-
nce on the ratio of the J-values. While Jones-Lee and Chilton set
he reduction in hazard rate at age 80 nearly 50 times the reduction
hey offered immediately to the middle aged person, they could as
ell have set the octogenerian’s reduction even higher and it would
ave made no difference.
Of course, in reality, the law of diminishing returns would mean
hat the 50 times greater reduction in hazard rate offered at the
ater age would attract much more than 50 times the cost. This
arge cost premium would only strengthen the relative attractive-
ess of immediate over delayed implementation for the protection
easure.
Thus the true conclusion to be drawn from Jones-Lee’s and
hilton’s hypothetical game is the exact opposite of the one that
hey present as their main argument against the J-value. The J-value
ill favour risk reduction now over risk reduction in 40 years’ time.
hus Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s p¨rincipalo¨bjection may  be dismissed
s poorly thought out and wrong.
.2. Fallacy 2: that the J-value should be applied on an
ndividualistic basis
Although Jones-Lee and Chilton do not make it clear that they are
aking a new (and incorrect) assumption, the mistaken idea that
he J-value should apply on an individualistic basis rather than at
he group level seems to underlie several of the misunderstandings
xhibited in their paper. The plainest statement of their implicit
iewpoint occurs in paragraph 3 of their Section 4, where they argue
gainst the averaging process inherent in the LQI and the J-value.
nstead they appear to favour dealing with individualised variables.
heir implied recommendation is then that the J-value should be
he average of all the individual J-values in the population to be
rotected. It will be shown that such a recommendation is ethi-
ally incorrect and at variance with the way that decisions on life
xtending activities are taken across the world.
A derivation of the J-value is given in Appendix B, where it is
ade plain that population-averaged parameters are used (as, of
ourse, did Thomas et al., 2006a, as well as succeeding papers).
hat this is the morally correct thing to do can be seen through
xamining the case where J takes its limiting desirable value, J = 1,
o that the actual expenditure and the ideal maximum spend are
qual. Combining Eqs. (B.2) and (B.3) at J = 1 gives
ıGˆ
∣∣
J=1 = −
G
1 − ε
ıX
X
(15)
here ıGˆ
∣∣
J=1 is the annual cost per person of the safety mea-ure at J = 1, G is the average income in the population to be
rotected, taken for ethical reasons to be the Gross Domestic Prod-
ct (GDP) per head, ε is the risk-aversion, found equal to 0.91
or developed countries (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a), X isironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
the population-average life expectancy and ıX is the population-
average improvement in life expectancy brought about by the
safety measure. The minus sign preceding the expression on the
right-hand side of Eq. (15) indicates that the annual cost of the
safety measure reduces the income per head.
The change in population-average life expectancy, ıX ,  is found
as
ıX =
af∑
k=a0
nk
nT
ıXk (16)
where ıXk is the average increase in life expectancy conferred by
the safety improvement on someone of age, k; nk is the number of
people in the population with age, k; a0 is the lowest age in the
population and af is the highest. Meanwhile nT is the total number
in the population, across all ages:
nT =
af∑
k=a0
nk (17)
The relationship between the average change in life expectancy
at age, k : ˛0 ≤ k ≤ ˛f , and the change, ıXkj , experienced by each
individual, j : j = 1, 2, ..., nk, of that age is:
nkıXk = ıXk1 + ıXk2 + ... + ıXkj + ... + ıXknk (18)
Substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (16) gives:
ıX = 1
nT(
ıXa01 + ıXa02 + ... + ıXa0na0 + ıXa0+1,1 + ıXa0+1,2 + ... + ıXa0+1,na0+1 + ....
ıXk,1 + ıXk,2 + ... + ıXk,nk + ... + ıXaf 1 + ıXaf 2 + ... + ıXaf naf
)
(19)
Finally, substituting from Eq. (19) into Eq. (15) gives:
ıGˆ
∣∣
J=1
= − 1
nT
G
1 − ε
1
X
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ıXa01 + ıXa02 + ... + ıXa0na0
+ıXa0+1,1 + ıXa0+1,2 + ... + ıXa0+1,na0+1 + ....
+ıXk,1 + ıXk,2 + ... + ıXk,nk + ...
+ıXaf 1 + ıXaf 2 + ... + ıXaf naf
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
(20)
Eq. (20) is important as it shows that calculating the ideal max-
imum annual payment using the J-value causes the gain in life
expectancy of each person in the group to be given the same
weighting. Formally,
∂
∂ıXkj
(
ıGˆ
∣∣
J=1
)
= − 1
nT
G
1 − ε
1
X
for all ages,k, and individuals,j(21)
Thus Eq. (20) embodies the ethical position that, under the J-
value method, each day of life extension is valued the same for each
member of the population, rich or poor, young or old. It is exactly
this moral and philosophical position that is argued for from a legal
perspective by Sunstein (2003), who  concludes
a¨ focus on statistical life-years has an important kind of neu-
trality: It treats everyone’s life-years the same. . . . it is better to
attend to statistical life-years than to statistical lives. If either
approach discriminates, it is one that relies only on statistical
lives, because that approach treats the life-years of older people
as worth more than the life-years of younger people."
Moreover, while the LQI valuation began as ’normative’, in the
economic sense of carrying a moral endorsement (viz. equal treat-
ment for citizens of all ages and incomes), the J-value embodying
the LQI principle is capable of producing an economically ’posi-
tive’ statement that can be put to the test. The success achieved in
that test (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a) implies that, when it
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Table  2
J-value for worked example, using different assumptions on intergenerational
equity.
Strong intergen-
erational
Weak intergen-
erational
Mixed intergen-
erational
c
i
u
c
J
a
J
n
t
e
t
2
r
a
a
o
r
J
a
J
w
A
E
t
p
l
t
2
i
a
t
J
w
t
o
e
c
w
a
t
r
s
t
Fig. 2. Individual J-value, J(a), against age, a, at the time of installation of the safetyequity equity equity
0.58 0.51 0.56
omes to decisions on life extending decisions, people’s behaviour
n nations all over the world is described well by the J-value.
Hence Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s argument against the averaging
sed in the J-value falls both ethically (Sunstein, 2003) and empiri-
ally (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a). The fact that the validated
-value method applies to groups of people rather than to individu-
ls invalidates a number of other peripheral objections raised by
ones-Lee and Chilton such as their objection to the use of "UK
ational averages for life-expectancy" (paragraph 3 of their Sec-
ion 4) and their advocacy of a separate rate of time preference for
ach individual as opposed to a social discount rate (paragraph 1 of
heir Section 5 and their end-note 13).
.2.1. Calculating J(a)
Even though the use of individualistic J-values transgresses the
equirements of ethics, it is nevertheless interesting to explore, as
n exercise, what would happen if the J-value were to be taken as an
verage of constituent J-values. It will be shown, using the example
f Appendix D, that the effect is likely to be relatively small.
Note ﬁrst that the J-value is given by Eq. (B.4) of Appendix B,
epeated below:
 = 1 − ε
G
ıGˆ
X
ıX
(B.4)
Two of the variables in Eq. (B.4),X and ıX ,  are dependent on age,
, so that we could deﬁne an age-speciﬁc J-value as:
(a) = 1 − ε
G
ıGˆ
X (a)
ıX (a)
(22)
hich might then be regarded as applying to individuals of age, a.
pplying the expectation operator, E (.),  produces:
(J (a)) = 1 − ε
G
ıGˆ × E
(
X (a)
ıX (a)
)
(23)
Jones-Lee’s and Chilton suggestion that the harmonic mean of
he denominator of the expectation term should be used at this
oint is incorrect, as explained in Appendix C. An approximate ana-
ytic method based on a Taylor series expansion is sometimes used
o ﬁnd the expectation of a ratio of random variables (e.g. Rice,
007, p. 160), but a more accurate result can be achieved numer-
cally when the details of a speciﬁc application of the J-value is
vailable, such as provided by Appendix D.
Appendix D details the case of a process plant where a safety sys-
em with a service lifetime of 25 years is under consideration. The
-value under strong intergenerational equity is given by J = 0.58,
ith J < 1.0 implying endorsement for the installation of the pro-
ection system under consideration. Little difference to the J-value
ccurs under the conditions of weak and mixed intergenerational
quity. See Table 2. (See Appendix B, Sections B.2 and B.3 for a dis-
ussion of the concept of intergenerational equity and its strong,
eak and mixed forms in the context of the J-value.)
Age-speciﬁc J-values, J (a),  may  be calculated for this example,
nd these are plotted against age, a, in Fig. 1, which also displays
he actual J-value marked on as the horizontal line. (Negative ages
efer to people yet to be born at the time of installation of the safety
ystem.) It is clear from Fig. 2 that J (a) stays close to the J-value for
he greatest part of the age range, for ∼ − 10 ≤ a ≤ ∼60. But J (a)measure: worked example of Appendix D. (The true J-value is marked on as a hori-
zontal line.).
rises at both ends of the age interval, with the growth becoming
increasingly marked towards the extremities of the range.
Older people getting closer to the end of their days at the time of
installation are increasingly likely to have too little time left to gain
full advantage from the system, and so their personal J-value will
be high. What would have been strongly in their personal interest
20 or 30 years ago, when J (a) ≈ J, will become less so as they age,
with, in the case under consideration, J (a) > 1 for a > 70.
The situation with those yet to be born is somewhat different.
Because of the low level of the natural hazard rate facing the young,
they will almost all (S (25) >  0.99) experience the beneﬁt the pro-
tection offers for the full period from their date of birth to the date
when the protection system is retired at the end of its 25 year life-
time. The only reason such young people should regard the system
as poor value for money is that the protection system comes out of
service too soon, before they reach the age of 25, before they will
have experienced its full beneﬁt. If a similar new system with more
service time ahead of it were on offer as a follow-on replacement,
it would be in their interest (in the sense that J (a) < 1) to have it
installed in place of the old safety system when the ﬁrst system
comes to the end of its life.
The average value, E (J (a)) =  0.93, for the worked example turns
out to be 60% higher than the actual J-value based on strong inter-
generational equity: J = 0.58. Thus it constitutes an approximation
to the J-value, but one that would be somewhat biased against the
implementation of the protection measure.
In fact, the measure, E (J (a)),  fails the ethical criterion suggested
by Sunstein (2003) that each person’s next day of life should be
valued the same, rich or poor, old or young. There is, of course,
nothing to stop anyone calculating J (a) on a personal basis, and
such a calculation might, indeed, provide that person with some
guidance. However, it is not a suitable basis for spending decisions
taken on behalf of the group to be protected.
2.3. Fallacy 3: that the J-value is a step on the way to ﬁnding an
improved estimate of the v¨alue of a prevented fatality(¨VPF)
Jones-Lee and Chilton devote a signiﬁcant part of their critique
of the J-value trying to defend the UK VPF and their derivation of
it. Despite their claim that their work has been subject to "much
scrutiny by the Health and Safety Executive" and to "ongoing
review" in a document co-authored by Jones-Lee and Spackman,
they have failed to answer the important criticisms of the VPF that
have appeared in the scientiﬁc literature. Jones-Lee and Chilton
express the hope in their end-note 14 that:
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"in Chilton et al. (2015) it is shown that Thomas and Vaughan’s
(2014 [Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a]) criticisms are, in the main,
ill-founded and somewhat spurious."
Sadly for them, this statement is entirely inaccurate. The mul-
iple ﬂaws in their interpretation of their data revealed in Thomas
nd Vaughan (2015a) are fundamental and invalidate their results.
he two attempts to defend their methodology (Chilton et al., 2015,
ones-Lee and Loomes, 2015) were refuted comprehensively by
homas and Vaughan (2015b, c). It is thus clear that the VPF in
se for the best part of the last 20 years in the UK has not been ﬁt
or purpose.
Jones-Lee and Chilton are clearly happiest talking about the VPF
nd they spend time attempting to derive a VPF that they claim
s implied by the J-value. They also devote effort to devising con-
traints on how (and, apparently, how not) a gain in life expectancy
an be translated into a VPF (paragraph 4 of their Section 1). Such
xtensive concern with the VPF in a paper apparently discussing the
-value is odd, and gives the erroneous impression that the J-value
s a step on the way to deriving a VPF.
The stance is particularly strange when the proponents of the
-value have made it fully clear that the VPF can only ever be a
rude measure for the valuation of human life. Detailed criticisms
f the concept of a VPF have appeared in, for example, Thomas
nd Vaughan (2013); Thomas and Waddington (2017b); Thomas
2017b) and Thomas (2017c). These criticisms are additional to the
emonstration (Thomas and Vaughan, 2015a, b,c) of the invalidat-
ng ﬂaws associated with the derivation of the VPF used in the UK
Carthy et al., 1999).
Given the apparent confusion on the part of Jones-Lee and
hilton, we state here, for the avoidance of doubt that the J-value
oes not use the VPF and that it is not part of the J-value’s purpose
o ﬁnd a VPF, which is a poor measure of human harm.
The ﬂexibility of the J-value approach makes it possible, of
ourse, to extrapolate from J-value results to estimate a value of
ife-to-come for the average person in the population. But it is cer-
ainly not the case, as hopefully suggested by Jones-Lee and Chilton
hat
"the J-value model actually produces an implied VPF that is very
much closer to the DfT ﬁgure"
Jones-Lee and Chilton, Section 5, paragraph 1
Carrying out the exercise shows how the UK VPF is set anoma-
ously low (Thomas, 2018a, b). This is a worrying situation for UK
itizens when it is realised that the Government makes extensive
se of the UK VPF as a spending criterion in a large number of its
epartments and agencies (Deloitte, 2009).
.4. Fallacy 4: that it is invalid to put a value on the gain in life
xpectancy unless it results from a reduction in hazard rate
onﬁned to the next year
By cloaking their comments in the straw-man proposition that
he J-value is intended to be a step on the way to ﬁnding an
mproved ﬁgure for the VPF, Jones-Lee and Chilton may  have cre-
ted the erroneous impression that it is in some way invalid to
alculate the gain in life expectancy that a protection system will
ring except over the coming year:
"it is necessary to ensure that the gains in life expectancy being
valued are the result of reductions in the risk of death during
the coming year, rather than delayed risk reductions that will
be effective only in later years of life"ection 1, paragraph 4, Jones-Lee and Chilton (2017).
A similar idea reappears in the ﬁrst sentence of the last para-
raph of Section 3:ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
"In short, the fundamental conceptual limitation of the J-value
model is that it focuses exclusively on the increase in life
expectancy resulting from a reduction in the hazard rate for any
given year"
This statement is perplexing. Even a cursory look just the titles of
published papers given on www.jvalue.co.uk would have revealed
this to be a ludicrous claim, as the J-value has always been applied to
assess protection systems with mission times that could be years or
decades long. Papers listed on that easy-to-google website include:
• T¨he life extension achieved by eliminating a prolonged radiation
exposure(¨Thomas et al., 2006c)
• A¨nalytical techniques for faster calculation of the life extension
achieved by eliminating a prolonged radiation exposure(¨Thomas
et al., 2007a),
• N¨umerical techniques for speeding up the calculation of the
life extension brought about by removing a prolonged radiation
exposure (¨Jones et al., 2007),
• C¨alculating the beneﬁt to workers of averting a radiation expo-
sure lasting longer than the working lifetime(¨Thomas and Jones,
2009).
Nevertheless, Jones-Lee and Chilton claim there are "clear the-
oretical and empirical grounds" for their view that the change in
hazard rate should be conﬁned to one year, and quote, among oth-
ers, Johannesson et al. (1997). The reference to Johannesson et al.
(1997) is striking because in their study, those authors calculate the
total change in life expectancy caused by a small reduction in the
hazard rate that lasts for much longer than "the coming year" stip-
ulated by Jones-Lee and Chilton. In fact, the reduction persists for
the rest of the person’s life ("permanent change in the hazard rate").
Johannesson et al. then produce a "value of a statistical life" from
their estimate of the worth of the total change in life expectancy.
Dividing this monetary sum by the change in life expectancy to give
the value of a life year, they then multiply by the expected life to
come. The value of life is thus made proportional to life expectancy,
a reasonable proposition that is, of course reﬂected in the LQI and
the J-value (see Eq.s (A.1) and (A.5)).
Thus, while the work by Johannesson et al. is quoted in aid
by Jones-Lee and Chilton, far from conﬁrming their argument, the
Johannesson study runs directly counter to it.
In fact, Johannesson et al. (1997) were not entirely happy
with their results, which rested on an opinion survey. Interest-
ingly, they commented in the last paragraph of their Concluding
Remarks: A¨nother possibility is that our valuation question did
not workb¨efore ending with the ﬁnal words: o¨ur results should
nevertheless be interpreted with caution¨– a frank acknowledge-
ment of the difﬁculties associated with stated preference methods.
For a further discussion of the problems in obtaining a meaningful
answer from an opinion survey, see Thomas (2018c).
To clear up any lingering anxiety that it might be invalid to use
the gain in life expectancy unless it results from a reduction in
hazard rate conﬁned to the next year, Appendices E and F derive
expressions for change in life expectancy for the industrially rel-
evant case where the safety system or measure brings a uniform
and immediate reduction in hazard rate throughout the time, TS ,
it is in service, which may  be several decades. Appendix E details
the derivation for the members of the public in the protected group
who are living at the time of installation or initiation of the safety
measure. Appendix F does the same for the members of the pro-
tected group who are born during the service time of the protection
measure. The overall change of life expectancy, ıXP , for the com-
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ined cohort being protected is then given by Eq.s (F.11),(E.16) and
F.10),repeated below:
XP =
X (0) ıX1 + TSıX2
X (0) + TS
(F.11)
here
X1 = 1
X (0)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
˛o−TS∫
a=0
a+TS∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dtda +
˛o−TS∫
a=0
˛0∫
t=a+TS
(
ebTS − 1
)
S (t)dtda
+
˛0∫
a=˛o−TS
˛0∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dtda
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(E.16)
and
X2 = 1TS
⎛
⎝ TS∫
=0
TS−∫
t=0
S (t)
(
ebt − 1
)
dtd +
TS∫
=0
˛0∫
t=TS−
(eb(TS−) − 1) S (t)dtd
⎞
⎠ (F.10)
The above equations are clearly signiﬁcantly more complex
han Eq. (5), which represented the special case where the pro-
ection system had a service lifetime of only one year. Moreover
he absence of an analytic expression for S (t) means that the inte-
rations need to be performed numerically. But the equations give
 clear demonstration of how it is possible to calculate the change
n life expectancy for the protected population as a whole over a
rolonged period, during which the protection system is in service.
Eqs. (E.16) and (F.10) for ıX1 and ıX2 apply for the case where
he hazard is fatality in the immediate or short-term future. The
mportant case of nuclear radiation, where any possible death from
 radiation-induced cancer may  be delayed for decades after induc-
ion, is covered in the references previously cited in the bulleted list
bove.
.5. Fallacy 5: that the J-value implies that the individual judges
hether or not to pay his/her share of a protection system based
n his/her certain knowledge of the dates he/she will die with and
ithout the safety system
This perplexing suggestion is contained in the closing sentence
he last paragraph of Section 3 of Jones-Lee and Chilton (2017):
"In short, there is nothing that distinguishes the situation mod-
elled by Thomas et al. (2006) from the completely unrealistic
scenario in which an individual knows for certain how long
he/she will continue to survive and must then decide how much
he/she is willing to pay per annum for a marginal ’end-of-life’
addition to that known remaining survival time."
[The italics are those of Jones-Lee and Chilton.]
The claim reappears in the ﬁrst sentence of Section 4, pre-
umably under the assumption that the prior assertion of this
on-sequitur in Section 3 was enough to justify it:
"Given its failure to take adequate account of the effect of uncer-
tainty concerning the time of death, the J-value model can
therefore hardly be regarded as providing a satisfactory basis
for the quantitative analysis of individual attitudes to physical
risk."
In fact the J-value paper (Thomas et al., 2006a) cited by Jones-
ee and Chilton pays clear and obvious attention to the stochastic
ature of the threats under consideration. The theme is developed
urther in the companion papers carried by Process Safety and Envi-
onmental Protection on consecutive pages (Thomas et al., 2006b, c).
herefore it seems odd, to say the least, that such an opinion could
e formed and seriously advanced.ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 317
The article, Thomas et al. (2006c), in particular, contains a wealth
of detail on the delayed and probabilistic nature of the hazard from
nuclear radiation, based on Marshall et al. (1983). Interestingly
neither Jones-Lee and Chilton nor Spackman before them make
reference to the very important case of assessing nuclear safety,
as considered in Thomas et al. (2006c), all the more surprising in
Spackman’s case because his report was commissioned in the con-
text of nuclear safety, in fact by the Nuclear Division of the Health
and Safety Executive, the predecessor of today’s Ofﬁce of Nuclear
Regulation.
It is, of course, nonsense to suggest that the use of the J-value
implies a belief that the individual knows in advance the date on
which he/she will die, either with or without the beneﬁt of the
safety system. On the contrary, the length of life for an individual is
treated as a random variable, by deﬁnition not known in advance.
An accurate assessment of change in life expectancy is however
possible, both for individuals sharing the same age and for the pop-
ulation under consideration. The calculations make use of life tables
such as those provided, by the Ofﬁce of National Statistics (2017)
for the UK. Such tasks are, of course, performed routinely by actu-
aries in the insurance industry. It is the change in life expectancy
for the group of people to be protected that is used in calculating
the J-value.
The ancillary suggestion of Jones-Lee and Chilton that the life
expectancy gained from a safety measure will be added on at the
end of life is naive. What actually happens when a protection sys-
tem is implemented (with many years of service life such as the
25 years of the example of Appendix D), is that people of all ages in
the protected population will tend to live longer, so that there will
be rather more survivors at every age. Eq. (2) above governs this
effect.
Although neither Jones-Lee and Chilton nor Spackman make ref-
erence to the important topic of averting dose to reduce the number
of people dying from radiation cancer, it is worth spending a little
time on Lord Marshall’s model (Marshall et al., 1983) for the risk of
dying from exposure to ionising radiation, as it brings out clearly
the effect of a delayed, stochastic hazard.
Considering ﬁrst the case of a point exposure to non-acute, low-
dose radiation, there will be no increase in the risk of dying from a
radiation induced cancer for a decade, but the probability density
will then rise to a uniform level that depends on the magnitude of
the dose. The elevated risk will persist for the next 30 years before
falling back to zero thereafter. Thomas et al. (2006c) explain the way
that this maps onto increased hazard rates over longer periods for
more complex cases, where the exposure to ionizing radiation is
prolonged. The change of life expectancy for a subset of the popu-
lation potentially exposed will depend on the whole history of the
changed hazard rates over decades.
The Marshall model may  be used to examine further Jones-Lee’s
and Chilton’s ﬁrst sentence of the last paragraph in their Section 3
(part of which has been considered in Section 2.4 above):
"In short, the fundamental conceptual limitation of the J-value
model is that it focuses exclusively on the increase in life
expectancy resulting from a reduction in the hazard rate for any
given year and, as a result, is incapable of taking account of the
very much higher degree of fear or dread with which most peo-
ple view the prospect of immediate (or very early) death relative
to premature death in later years of life."
and to illustrate the lack of understanding on their part that may
have given rise to such a statement.
The ﬁrst thing to note, of course, is that the change in life
expectancy must depend on the proﬁle of the radiation dose over
time. Indeed, the radiation may  well persist for many decades,
as analysed after the big nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and
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mean using the most up-to-date information, but not in the case of
a retrospective calculation such as estimating J-values for the Cher-18 P. Thomas, I. Waddington / Process Safety an
ukushima Daiichi (Waddington et al., 2017). It would be quite
rong to attempt such a calculation with the hazard rate altered
nly for one year, as possibly recommended by Jones-Lee and
hilton. The espousal of such an idea would go against the precepts
f physics, biology and actuarial science.
The next thing to observe is that, as the risk of death from a
adiation-induced cancer is delayed for at least 10 years, the hazard
rom a continuing dose will remain at an elevated level for years
onger than the duration of the dose. In fact, careful mathematical
nalysis allows the average age at death to be determined for those
nfortunate enough to be victims of a radiation-induced cancer,
oth for any given starting age and for a population as a whole. This
as been done for both a point exposure and for a uniform dose over
 ﬁnite period of time (Thomas, 2017c). It is found that the average
adiation cancer victim in the UK will live into his or her sixties or
eventies, and that the average loss of life expectancy of radiation
ancer victims will lie between 9 and 22 years, roughly half or less
f the loss of life expectancy, 42 years, lost by the average person
ndergoing an immediately fatal accident in a train crash or a car
rash. This makes it clear, inter alia, that the UK VPF is unsuitable
or assessing how much to spend on reducing the risk of a nuclear
ccident. This would be so even if the ﬁgure assigned to the VPF
ad a basis in evidence, which, as previously noted, the UK VPF has
ot.
Interestingly, Jones-Lee and Chilton now seem to concede the
oint by citing, at the end of paragraph 4 of their Section 1, their
ecent paper on relative (different) valuations of cancer deaths
ersus car crash fatalities (McDonald et al., 2016). The paper by
cDonald et al. suggests that people will wish to spend signiﬁ-
antly less to avert a cancer that is delayed by decades. In this study,
57 citizens of Newcastle upon Tyne between the ages of 30 and
0 were asked to identify indifference probabilities for instanta-
eous death on the road in the year after next and for death from
ancer after 25 years. 136 people produced answers that could be
rocessed to give a ratio of the VPF associated with the delayed
ancer to the VPF of immediate death in a car crash in 2 years’ time.
he geometric mean of the 136 estimates of VPFcancer/VPFcar crash
as 0.228, subject a 95% conﬁdence interval of 0.095 to 0.545.
In fact, the use of the geometric mean as a consolidation measure
iolates the criterion of Structural View Independence. The geomet-
ic mean will always be less than the arithmetic mean that ought
o be used when interpreting people’s opinions if unanswerable
laims of bias are to be avoided (Thomas, 2014). Nevertheless the
cDonald paper is of general interest because the cancer delay of
5 years coincides with the mean delay before death of a radiation-
nduced cancer under the Marshall model. Moreover, from Thomas
2017c), the ratio of what a radiation cancer victim will lose, on
verage, compared with his/her loss in an immediately fatal rail
ccident or car crash lies between 0.214 and 0.524. This prompts
he thought that what McDonald, Chilton, Jones-Lee and Metcalf
ere observing (imperfectly because of the bias introduced by
heir choice of the geometric mean) was a sample of the people
n Newcastle valuing the cancer risk in proportion to their loss
f life expectancy rather than according to some vaguer notion of
read.
The McDonald paper (of which Jones-Lee and Chilton were co-
uthors) would then imply that people do not want to die early,
hether from a cancer or in a road crash, and weigh up their poten-
ial loss of life expectancy in the way modelled by the J-value. That
eople’s judgements on life extension should conform with the J-
alue would not, of course, be surprising, as it has been shown that
he J-value describes well the way people all over the world decide
n how much to spend on life extending measures (Thomas and
addington, 2017a).ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
2.6. Fallacy 6: that the risk-aversion used in J-value analysis has
remained at its 2006 estimate
As explained in Appendices A and B, risk-aversion, ε, is one of
the parameters used in the LQI and in J-value analysis (see Thomas
(2016) for a deﬁnition of risk-aversion and the history of its use
since 1728). In 2006, Thomas et al. (2006a) followed Pandey and
Nathwani (2003) in their derivation of a value for risk-aversion
based on an estimate of the average fraction of time spent working
via the w¨ork-life balance(¨see Eq.s (A.2),(A.4) and (A.5) of Appendix
A).
Jones-Lee and Chilton devote the whole of their Section 2, plus
their end-note 5, to a parallel conﬁrmation of the J-value as pre-
sented in Thomas et al. (2006a). They claim their way to be more
direct (although apparently it fails to derive a key result concern-
ing the optimal fraction of time spent working). They then assert
in paragraph 1 of their Section 4 that
"the income-leisure choice model underpinning Thomas et al.’s
(2006) analysis is somewhat oversimpliﬁed and unrealistic."
and spend most of the rest of that paragraph criticising the accuracy
of that model. In fact, that model and the method of estimating risk-
aversion were upgraded soon after Thomas et al. (2006a) appeared.
Pandey, Nathwani and Lind produced an improved economic
model in 2006 (Pandey et al., 2006) and this led them to modify
their estimate of risk-aversion. This economic model was adopted
in Thomas et al. (2010a). The latter, 2010 paper also derived a more
accurate ﬁgure for the UK working time fraction based on statistics
from the Ofﬁce of National Statistics.
Further progress followed in 2017 and the latest ﬁgure for
risk-aversion used in J-value calculations has been measured
empirically from pan-national data (Thomas and Waddington,
2017a). The new value for risk-aversion has also been reconciled
with the 2010 ﬁgure on the basis of 50:50 deal being struck between
the employer and the employee on how much satisfaction the aver-
age employee will gain from his work.
It follows that Jones-Lee’s and Chilton’s comments on the
accuracy of the 2006 ﬁgure for work-life balance and hence risk-
aversion ceased to have relevance after 2010 and are similarly
irrelevant today.
2.7. Fallacy 7: that the discount rates used in J-value analysis
have remained at their 2006 estimates
Remarks similar to those made in Section 2.6 apply here too.
Jones-Lee and Chilton spend most of paragraph 1 of their Section 5
considering a range of discount rates and are critical the discount
rates employed in Thomas et al. (2006a).
These criticisms are irrelevant as the rates now used with the
J-value are based on empirical evidence from pan-national data
(Thomas and Waddington, 2017a).
The principle of the J-value has, of course, stayed unchanged:
this subsection and its predecessor have been concerned only with
the problem of ﬁnding the best values of the parameters with which
to populate the J-value model.
It is worth adding that the some of the data to be used in calcu-
lating the J-value, such as life tables and GDP per head, will also vary
with the nation in question. These data may  also change over time,
making it necessary to match both the actuarial and the economic
ﬁgures to the date at which the J-value is needed. Often that willnobyl nuclear accident a quarter of a century after the event (e.g.
Waddington et al., 2017).
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.8. Fallacy 8: that the J-value should be rejected as too simple
Jones-Lee and Chilton suggest in the ﬁnal paragraph of their
ection 1 that the J-value is "too simplistic" and complain in the
pening paragraph of their Section 3 that:
"Prima facie, the J-value model would therefore appear to pro-
vide a simple and direct means of estimating a willingness to
pay-based VPF without the need to carry out a relatively compli-
cated and demanding stated preference or revealed preference
study"
A jarring feature of this statement is its attempt to lump together
tated preference and revealed preference method, even though
hey are diametrically opposed methods.Revealed preferences cor-
espond to John Locke’s dictum (Locke, 1690):
"I have always thought the actions of men  the best interpreters
of their thoughts"
The J-value is a revealed preference method, which has been val-
dated against pan-national data (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a).
By contrast, stated preference techniques, of which Jones-Lee
nd Chilton are proponents, suffer from the signiﬁcant defect iden-
iﬁed by Fujiwara and Campbell (2011):
r¨espondents in stated preference surveys may  have an incentive
to deliberately misrepresent their true preferences in order to
achieve a more desirable outcome for themselves . . . individuals
may  overstate their valuations of the good if they believe their
responses inﬂuence its provision and are unrelated to the price
they will be charged for it"
Jones-Lee and Chilton were, of course, co-authors of the stated
reference study on which the UK VPF is based. Interestingly, the
ost severe problems surrounding that study and hence the UK VPF
ame not so much from the problems raised by Fujiwara and Camp-
ell (although a degree of exaggeration may  well have been present
n their ﬁrst study (Beattie et al., 1998), the results of which they
ismissed as a¨berrant,¨ but which were, in fact, fully understand-
ble (Thomas and Vaughan, 2014)). No; the problems arose from
he introduction of a complicated way of interpreting their opinion
urvey results, namely the two-injury chained method, which their
wn data showed was invalid, as discussed in Section 2.3 above.
Jones-Lee and Chilton then make their ﬁnal charge against the
-value in the closing words of their last paragraph: "this is a gross
ver-simpliﬁcation". Such a claim merits further investigation.
Complaining about a theory because it is simple is unusual both
n science and in scientiﬁc philosophy. Scientists normally adopt
ckham’s razor and prefer the simpler explanation. Here an inter-
sting example is provided by the mathematician, John L. Casti
1991):
T¨he commonly held view is that Copernicus’s heliocentric model
vanquished the competition, especially the geocentric view of
Ptolemy, because it gave better predictions of the positions of
the celestial bodies. In actual fact, the predictions of the Coper-
nican model were a little worse than those obtained using the
complicated series of epicycles and other curves constituting
the Ptolemaic scheme, at least to within the accuracy available
using the measuring instruments of the time. No, the real sell-
ing point of the Copernican model was that it was much simpler
than the competition, yet still gave a reasonably good account
of the observational evidence."
eanwhile, the philosopher, Sir Karl Popper (1934) explains why
implicity is so highly prized in the following terms:
S¨imple statements, if knowledge is our object, are to be prized
more highly than less simple ones because they tell us more;ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 319
because their empirical content is greater; and because they are
better testable."
(Popper’s italics.) He later suggests (Popper, 1983) that
t¨he following maxim holds for all sciences: Never aim for more
precision than is required for the problem in hand."
This has echoes of Einstein’s earlier words (Einstein, 1934):
I¨t can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to
make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as pos-
sible without having to surrender the adequate representation
of a single datum of experience."
now often relayed in the compressed version: E¨verything should
be made as simple as possible but not simpler" (Calaprice, 2010).
Einstein (1934) makes his support for the simplest theories further
clear:
I¨t is essential for our point of view that we  can arrive at these
constructions and the laws relating them one with another by
adhering to the principle of searching for the mathematically
simplest concepts and their connections."
So simplicity is regarded by scientists and philosophers as a good
thing in a scientiﬁc theory rather than the disadvantage painted by
Jones-Lee and Chilton. And the J-value may  indeed be regarded as
scientiﬁc in the terms laid down by Sir Karl Popper (1934), as it
can be tested against empirical evidence (Thomas and Waddington,
2017a; Thomas, 2017a).
But how simple is the J-value? The hardest task in applying the
J-value is to calculate the change of life expectancy, which requires
ﬁrst a knowledge of the life tables for the country concerned and
then the expertise to carry out the calculation. In fact, life tables
applicable to 180 nations were assembled as part of the NREFS
project (Thomas and May, 2017), together with the necessary eco-
nomic data, so that the J-value can already be applied in over 90%
of the world’s sovereign states. The calculational methods are rela-
tively straightforward for cases where the hazard to be averted is an
immediately fatal accident, although more complex where death,
should it occur, is delayed and related by a stochastic process to a
prior toxic exposure. Examples of the latter are asbestosis, pneumo-
coniosis and radiation-induced cancer. Nevertheless, methods have
been developed for such cases, which can cope with a time-varying
exposure lasting a hundred years or more.
Turning to the theory, the J-value draws heavily on the LQI, an
elegant and powerful construct put forward by Nathwani et al.
(1997). The recent validation exercise (Thomas and Waddington,
2017a) has removed the need to consider discounting future life
expectancy and thus allowed a further simpliﬁcation, as discussed
in Appendix A. Moreover, the same validation exercise allowed risk-
aversion to be speciﬁed for developed and developing nations, thus
obviating the need to relate it to the work-life balance (although a
route for doing so is also given). The additional theory behind the
J-value is then laid out in Appendix B.
Simplicity is a difﬁcult thing to quantify, but it is hoped that the
J-value, as applied to real-world situations, preserves the powerful
simplicity of the LQI on which it is based. However, the elegance of
the LQI should not disguise from us the fact that it deals with a near-
inﬁnite multiplicity of complicated things: nothing less than all the
desirable activities that human beings choose to do, conditioned,
as must be the case, by their resources.
The utility of income may  be written in the form, u (G) = G1−ε,
and this fact is allowed for by the LQI, Q, as given in Eq. (A.5),
repeated below:
Q = G1−εX (A.5)
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his reveals the LQI to be the sum total of the future utility for the
verage person over the rest of his/her life. Thus the LQI can be seen
o be a very general statement; moreover, the evidence shows that
he J-value is applicable to all societies in the world for which data
xist, as demonstrated in Thomas and Waddington (2017a).
A strikingly similar description of the value of life is proposed
rom a philosopher’s perspective by John Broome (2006):
F¨irst of all, the value of a person’s life is a quantitative matter.
Some people’s lives go better than those of others - some people
have better lives than others. One of the things that helps to
determine how good your life is, is how long it goes on for. For
most of us, having a longer life would be better than having a
shorter life. If you expose somebody to risk by driving down a
street and, as a matter of bad luck, you kill her, then what you
have done is to deprive her of the rest of her life. That may  be a
big deprivation or it may  be a comparatively small deprivation.
If she is young, with a full life ahead of her, it is a very big harm
that you have imposed on her. On the other hand, if she was  not
very far from death in any case, then it is a much smaller harm
that you have imposed on her. The value of life is a quantitative
matter. Some people suggest that life has an inﬁnite value but it
does not: it has a ﬁnite value and it is a matter of quantity. That
is one point.
"The second point I would like to make is that the value of a
person’s life is comparable, or commensurable as philosophers
often say, with the value of mundane things such as chatting to
your friends or having a holiday. . . . what you lose, if you lose
your life, is the sort of mundane goods that you have in your life.
If your life is shortened by a year, what you lose is your annual
holiday and all the fun you would have during that year – the
chatting to friends, and so on, that you would have during that
year. In fact, the value of life is nothing other than the value of
the mundane goods that occur in it and so there is no problem
with commensurability between life and other goods, and they
can be measured on the same scale."
It would be impossible, as a practical possibility, to enumerate
ach of the "mundane goodsi¨n each person’s life, let alone evaluate
ach one in a way  that mimicked the approach of the person bene-
ting. The problem can be circumvented only by postulating a very
eneral measure of the quality of life, namely the LQI, which, as we
ave seen, is the sum total of the average person’s utility from now
n.
To explore the issues involved in any attempt to delve further
nto the ways in which utility is experienced, let us compare and
ontrast the LQI with the Human Development Index (HDI), used by
he United Nations (2018a) to assess the development of a country.
he HDI bears some marked similarities to the LQI, in that it includes
s constituents two variables that approximate those used in the
QI, namely
utility of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, based on a sim-
ilar value for risk-aversion, namely ε = 1.0 (cf. the utility of GDP
per capita for the LQI, calculated using ε = 0.95 when all countries
in the world are considered (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a)).
life expectancy at birth (cf. life expectancy averaged over all ages
for the LQI)
owever, it differs from the LQI byincluding, as an additional constituent variable, the average of the
mean years of schooling that have been received by the existing
adult population and the expected years of schooling for children
just starting school.ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
• setting targets for each of its constituent variables, where the tar-
gets are generally chosen to be somewhat higher than the values
pertaining in highly developed countries:
© the utility of 75,000 International Dollars per year income
© 85 years life expectancy at birth (combined genders)
© 16.5 years of average schooling (including higher education)
• calculating the relative distance of each of its 3 constituent vari-
ables from the target provided
• calculating the ﬁnal HDI from the third root of the product of the
three relative distances.
It will be seen immediately that the HDI, although sharing
a number of similarities with the LQI, is less simple and more
prescriptive. H¨igher marksa¨re given the closer the nation under
examination approaches the practice of highly developed nations.
In particular the HDI will r¨ewardw¨ith a higher index a nation that
chooses to devote more of its resource to schooling. This makes it
less general and could restrict its usefulness as a guide to modify-
ing national policy and behaviour. After all, it might well be that the
nation could achieve higher overall welfare by devoting more of its
resources to other, higher-priority items before striving to match
the amount of schooling provided in highly developed countries.
To be fair, the HDI makes no claim to do other than provide a
s¨ummary measure of [a nation’s] achievements in three key dimen-
sions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to
knowledge and a decent standard of living(¨UN, 2018b). But while
there is no dispute that good provision of primary, secondary and
tertiary education is a feature of developed countries, the promi-
nence given to a¨ccess to knowledgei¨n the HDI will tend to reduce
the policy choices available to the citizens of a less developed coun-
try that takes the index as its sole guide. A less constrained path to
development is explored in Thomas and Waddington (2017a). The
J-value model presented there (based, of course, on the LQI), offers
the interpretation that the citizens of a country will continually
trade off a fraction of their income to promote their longer life, and
that wealth and longevity will thereby increase in tandem following
the curve documented by Preston (1975). Thus the J-value model
explains the route by which all countries may  progress further up
the Preston curve as they get richer.
Moreover, although the HDI is less simple than the LQI, it does
not come close to satisfying the need identiﬁed by John Broome
to represent the multiplicity of mundane things that make up the
bright spots in people’s lives, a sample of which he listed. But would
the situation be helped by further augmentation of such an index
to cover other plausible, desirable items such as the use of a gym-
nasium or a swimming pool, listening to music, going to the opera,
attending the theatre etc? How would we decide what to include
and what to leave out for people in different nations in the world?
In reality, the choice of what to do with his/her resources must
be and will be left to the individual, an idea that corresponds to
ﬁnding the overall utility of income but not to specifying precisely
the activities in which that utility will be manifested. Thus we are
directed back towards the LQI and the J-value for guidance on life
extending decisions.
Finally on the interesting point of the simplicity or otherwise
of a theory in the social sciences, Milton Friedman (1953,1966)
comments
A¨ hypothesis is important if it ’explains’ much by little, that is,
if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass
of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phe-
nomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the
basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis
must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account
of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circum-
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stances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for
the phenomena to be explained.
"To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant question to
ask about the ’assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are
descriptively ’realistic’, for they never are, but whether they are
sufﬁciently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And
this question can be answered only by seeing whether the the-
ory works, which means whether it yields sufﬁciently accurate
predictions."
The success in the test of the J-value model and hence the
QI concept against pan-national data (Thomas and Waddington,
017a), a non-trivial trial involving the behaviour of people in the
verwhelming majority of nations in the world, shows that the J-
alue provides a good description of the link between changes in
ife expectancy and changes in average income (GDP per head). Fur-
her corroboration is offered by Thomas (2017a). It is hoped that the
-value retains sufﬁcient simplicity to be seen as "explaining much
y little" in the way advocated by Milton Friedman.
. Discussion
It is a shame that Jones-Lee and Chilton waited for over 10 years
efore responding to the ﬁrst J-value paper (Thomas et al., 2006a),
articularly as they evince no awareness of the J-value develop-
ents that have taken place in the intervening years (nor even of
 companion J-value paper, Thomas et al. (2006c), published in the
ame journal issue as the ﬁrst). It is also a pity that they did not
hoose to respond directly to PSEP, the journal that carried that
rst J-value article. However we have attempted to rectify both
hese deﬁciencies, ﬁrst by giving an account of how the J-value
as advanced since 2006 (Appendix A) and then by submitting our
esponse to PSEP for publication. Moreover, while we have worked
hrough an example relevant to the delayed hazards of nuclear radi-
tion in previous papers (e.g. Thomas and Jones, 2010; Waddington
t al., 2017), we have included in this paper a worked example for
 high hazard process plant where the risk is of death immedi-
tely or in the short term following an accident (Appendix D). We
ave also given details, previously unpublished, of how to calcu-
ate the gain in life expectancy from averting such an immediate
isk (Appendices E and F).
While the quality of the points made by Jones-Lee and Chilton
ay  not be high, nevertheless the process of providing answers has
llowed some interesting implications of the J-value to be brought
ut. These are likely to be of interest both to users of the J-value
ethod and more generally. Some of the more salient issues will
e discussed further below.
The p¨rincipalp¨roposition put forward by Jones-Lee and Chilton,
amely that the J-value should regarded as invalid if less exten-
ion of life is gained from lowering the hazard rate now than from
 delayed hazard reduction that is tens of times higher, has been
hown to be ill thought out and wrong. Even after allowing for the
xtreme and unjustiﬁed weighting given by Jones-Lee and Chilton
o the latter risk reduction over the former, the early lowering of
azard is shown by the J-value to be preferable by a large mar-
in, contrary to their claims. Jones-Lee and Chilton perpetrated the
conomic solecism of ignoring the cost of the risk reduction.
In fact, Jones-Lee and Chilton make no attempt to substanti-
te their implicit assertion that a 47 times bigger reduction in risk
39 times using recent ONS life tables) in 40 years’ time ought be
egarded as comparable with a much smaller hazard reduction
ow. Even though, as shown, such an attempt to boost the attraction
f the delayed risk reduction must ultimately fail, it is self-evidently
 ludicrous proposition. It is quite out of line with the action of an
ndustrial protection system on a high-hazard process plant, whichironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 321
will offer the same degree of hazard rate reduction to all members
of the public living nearby, irrespective of age.
A point of general interest arises nevertheless, in that the J-value
conﬁrms that it will be better to institute protection against a haz-
ard now rather than to delay it. This ﬁnding is hardly surprising,
but the J-value provides a way of quantifying the effect.
A more interesting issue is explored in Section 2.2, namely how
far the J-value should apply to individuals within a group to be
protected as opposed to the group as a whole. Were this to be
so, the J-value for the group should be based on the average of
all the individual J-values. Individual J-values allowing for age-
dictated variations in life expectancy and change of life expectancy
have been calculated for the worked example given in Appendix D,
where a protection system with a 25 year life is under considera-
tion for a high-hazard process plant. It is found that the individual
J-values stay close to the group J-value for the middle range of ages,
but start to rise at either end, both for older people and for those
yet to be born at the time of installation. The reason in both cases
is that these people would not experience the full duration of the
protection offered by the safety system, either because they are
likely to die before the system comes out of service (old people) or
because its working lifetime ends too early for them (those born
during its period of service). The overall average of age-dependent
J-values then comes out as higher than the group J-value, but not
greatly so.
But Section 2.2 shows that only by calculating the J-value for
the group as a whole, using group-averaged internal values, can
the proposition advanced by Sunstein (2003) be fulﬁlled, namely
that a day of life extension is valued the same for each member
of the population, rich or poor, young or old. Thus ethics demand
that the J-value be calculated using average values for income, life
expectancy and change of life expectancy for the group as a whole.
This moral stance has now been conﬁrmed by the validation of the
J-value against pan-national data: the J-value models the way that
decisions on life extending measures are made on average in 180
out of the 193 nations in the UN. This conﬁrms the J-value as a
yardstick by which any particular decision on safety spending can
be judged.
As shown in Section 2.8, Jones-Lee and Chilton ﬁnd themselves
in opposition to some of the world’s most eminent scientists,
economists and philosophers when they argue in favour of com-
plication and against simplicity for a scientiﬁc theory such as the
J-value. Their stance may, of course, be conditioned by the fact that
they are originators and proponents of the UK  VPF, which is based
on their r¨elatively complicated and demanding stated preference
study.¨
Throughout their paper, Jones-Lee and Chilton attempt to talk
up the VPF and denigrate the J-value. But a major problem with their
position is that their method of interpreting their stated preference
data, complicated or not, has been shown to be scientiﬁcally invalid.
The result is that the UK VPF has no basis in evidence. But extensive
evidence now exists for the J-value being not only a simple but a
valid description of the way  that people value human life across the
world.
4. Conclusions
A detailed examination of the criticisms of the J-value made by
Jones-Lee and Chilton reveals them to be without merit. In partic-
ular, their p¨rincipalo¨bjection has been shown to be poorly thought
out and based, inter alia, on an elementary economic error. Their
other points fare little better when subjected to scrutiny.
However, the exercise of answering the points raised by Jones-
Lee and Chilton has brought out additional implications of the
J-value that will be of interest both to users of the J-value method
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nd more generally. Moreover, the task has prompted a review
f J-value developments over the 12 years since the ﬁrst paper
ppeared in PSEP. In addition, a worked example has been provided
or a high-hazard process plant where the risk involves death either
mmediately or in the short term.
A feature of their critique is the attempt by Jones-Lee and
hilton, originators and proponents of the UK VPF, to talk up the
PF while talking the J-value down. However, the method used by
ones-Lee and Chilton to derive the UK VPF has been shown pre-
iously in PSEP to be invalid, so that the UK VPF has no basis in
vidence.
By contrast the J-value has been validated against empirical data.
he J-value covers both systems designed to reduce the chance of
eath in the short term and those intended to safeguard against
eath that, if it occurs, will be delayed by years or decades. In the
atter case, it has been used to examine the high-proﬁle policy of
vacuation after a big nuclear accident.
The J-value may  be used to assess safety measures in both high
azard and all other industries. A fully objective and validated
ethod is thus currently available to answer the vexed question
f how much ought to be spent on protecting human life.
ppendix A The evolution of the life quality index and
-value since 2006
The LQI, Q, recommended by Pandey and Nathwani (2003), had
he form
 = GqXd (A.1)
here G was the average income, taken for ethical reasons to
e Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person, and Xd was  the
opulation-average discounted life expectancy. (Future utility of
ncome was the true subject of the discounting, but this is equiv-
lent to discounting life expectancy, as explained in Thomas et al.,
010a, Section 5). Meanwhile q was the ratio of time spent in work
o that spent not working, in other words, the w¨ork-life balance:¨
 = w0
1 − w0
(A.2)
n which w0 is the population-average time spent working. The for-
ulation of Eq. (A.1) was used in the ﬁrst J-value paper (Thomas
t al., 2006a), which also gave a general derivation for the LQI based
n the postulate that the fundamental variables inﬂuencing the cur-
ent quality of life for the average individual were ﬁrst how long
e/she could expect to live from now on and secondly how much
e/she would have available to spend, both on life’s necessities and
n its luxuries.
Pandey et al. (2006) then introduced a Cobb-Douglas Production
unction to model the use of labour in national production, leading
o a revised expression for q:
 = 1

w0
1 − w0
(A.3)
ith  equal to the share of wages in GDP. The newer expression
or q was adopted for the J-value in Thomas et al. (2010), where it
as also shown that
 = 1 − ε (A.4)
n which ε is risk-aversion (or the negative of the elasticity of
arginal utility of income).
The general form of the LQI (Eq.s (A.1) and (A.4)) was used in
017 (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a) to model the decisions of
hose considering the adoption of life-extending measures all over
he world, assuming that their decisions were governed by a J-
alue of 1.0. Good correspondence between actual and predicted
opulation-average life expectancy was found for 180 out of theironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
193 nations recognised by the United Nations in 2009 and excellent
correspondence for 162 countries.
Based on empirical data, the value of risk-aversion, ε, used in
taking life extending decisions was  found to be 0.91 for developed
countries, close in value to previous, independent estimates. More-
over, it was possible to reconcile the new ﬁgure with the 2010 value
on the basis of a 50:50 bargain between employer and employee on
the amount of personal satisfaction the employee derives from his
work. In addition, the best J-value model resulted from setting the
rate used to discount future life expectancy, the n¨et discountr¨ate,
to zero. This implies a very low value of pure time discount rate, a
result that conforms closely with the work of Ramsey (1928) and
Stern (2007, 2009, 2015), the former going so far as to describe
the practice of discounting later enjoyments as e¨thically indefensi-
blea¨nd arising m¨erely from the weakness of the imagination.¨
The validation exercises (Thomas and Waddington, 2017a;
Thomas, 2017a) have thus established the LQI  for use with the
J-value as:
Q = G1−εX (A.5)
where population-average values are used for income, G, and life
expectancy, X.
While the previous work on the LQI, particularly the fundamen-
tally important insights of Nathwani et al. (1997), guided the choice
of function, viz.  G1−εX , the empirical conﬁrmation of the validity of
Eq. (A.5) means that its stands independent of the arguments used
to derive the LQI.
Since the utility of income may  be written in the form u (G) =
G1−ε (Thomas, 2016), Eq. (A.5) yields the intuitively satisfying inter-
pretation that the life quality of the average person in the group is
the sum of the future utility of his/her income over the expected
future years. This interpretation is strongly in line with philosopher
John Broome’s perspective (2006). See also Section 2.8.
Appendix B Finding the J-value
B.1. Deriving the J-value from the LQI
Perturbing Eq. (A.5) yields:
ıQ
Q
= (1 − ε) ıG
G
+ ıX
X
(B.1)
where ıX is the average change in life expectancy across the popu-
lation. The requirement that the safety measure should not produce
a net disbeneﬁt is that ıQ ≥ 0, with the limiting condition, ıQ = 0.
Applying this to Eq. (B.1) gives the maximum it is worth paying
per person per year to achieve a gain in population-average life
expectancy, ıX ,  as:
ıG = − G
1 − ε
ıX
X
(B.2)
where the negative sign preceding the terms on the right indicates
a reduction in effective annual income. The J-value is then the ratio
of the actual cost per year, ıGˆ, to the maximum reasonable cost per
year:
J = ıGˆ
ıG
(B.3)
Hence the J-value may  be written:
1 − ε X
J =
G
ıGˆ
ıX
(B.4)
J > 1 implies that the safety measure is, in the absence of special
pleading to the contrary, too expensive.
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.2. Converting actual up-front and ongoing payments into a
ingle annual payment, ıGˆ
In the general case, a safety system may  involve the following
osts:
an up-front expenditure, ıVˆN1,
a stream of payments, ı ˆN (t), consisting of interest and some
repaid principal, made over a period of y years at a commer-
cial interest rate net of inﬂation, rc . [The stipulation that this rate
needs to be net of inﬂation means that rc is likely to be close to the
social discount rate, r∗, which is found to be equal to the long-
term national growth rate per head (Thomas and Waddington,
2017a; Thomas, 2017a)].
the cost of maintenance, ımˆ (t), of the system over its lifetime in
service, TS .
The up-front equivalent, ıVˆN2, of the payments, ı ˆN (t), may  be
alculated by amortizing over the repayment period, y, using the
ommercial interest rate, rc:
VˆN2 =
y∫
0
e−rctı ˆN (t)dt = ı ˆN
1 − e−rcy
rc
(B.5)
here the last step conforms to the assumption that the payment is
he same each year, viz.  ı ˆN (t) = ı ˆN for all t in the interval consid-
red. Similarly, the up-front equivalent of an annual maintenance
ost, ımˆ, will be:
VˆN3 = ımˆ
1 − e−rcTR
rc
(B.6)
The total equivalent up-front cost, ıVˆN , is then found by adding
ll the components:
VˆN =
3∑
i=1
ıVˆNi (B.7)
Making the usual J-value assumption of a steady state popula-
ion, the number of people able to make a payment at any given
ime will always be the same, namely the number, N, of people
live at any given time, now and in the future. Hence the average
otal amount, ıVˆ , notionally paid by one person is given by
Vˆ = ıVˆN
N
(B.8)
ıGˆ is found from ıVˆ by distributing this sum over an appropriate
ime interval using the inverse process described by Eq.s (B.5) and
B.6) but now using the social discount rate, r∗.
Someone whose life is preserved by a safety system will enjoy
he beneﬁt, viz. remaining alive, for the rest of his/her life, as
xplained by Broome (2006). Such a beneﬁt will be enjoyed on
verage over the population-average life expectancy, suggesting
his length of time should be the notional repayment term.
There are two candidates for the population-average life
xpectancy for use in this way: (i) the mean life expectancy, X1,
f those alive at the installation of the protective measure, and (ii)
he average expected life to come, XP , of those living and those
orn during the service lifetime, TS , of the protection system, where
1 ≤ XP ≤ X (0) as 0 ≤ TS ≤ ∞,  with the life expectancy at birth,
(0) ≈ 2X1 for developed countries (Thomas and Waddington,
017a). To distinguish between the two options, it is useful to
ppeal to the notion of intergenerational equity, where the United
ations Educational Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization concluded
n its "Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Genera-
ions Towards Future Generations,¨ Article 1 (UNESCO, 1997):ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 323
T¨he present generations have the responsibility of ensuring that
the needs and interests of present and future generations are
fully safeguarded."
Also of relevance is the call of the World Health Organization (Coote,
2015), in the context of health inequalities, for:
"action to stop children from inheriting health risks from their
parents and grandparents and passing them on to their own
offspring."
The shorter repayment period, X1, corresponds to the idea of
strong inter-generational equity, in the sense that the notional loan
will be repaid by the end of the lifetime of the average person
in the current generation, taken to be those living at the time of
installation. Thus the current generation will spare all succeeding
cohorts of any part of the ﬁnancial burden. The second conforms
to a weaker form, where the repayment period will be longer, at
XP , which will be up to twice the average lifetime of those living
at the time the safety measure was installed. Both options limit
the length of time over which payment for the safety measure is
made – the m¨ortgagei¨s not extended indeﬁnitely into the future, in
line with the need for intergenerational fairness. The stronger form
means that the bill will be paid in full at the end of the lifetime
of the current generation, while the weaker alternative extends
the payment period some way  into the lifetime of the succeeding
generation but not beyond, again limiting the ﬁnancial burden on
future generations.
The appropriate discount rate for calculating the notional annual
repayments will be the social discount rate, r∗, which is to be
equal to the long-term national growth rate per head (Thomas and
Waddington, 2017a; Thomas, 2017a). Hence
ıGˆ = r∗
1 − e−r∗T
ıVˆN
N
where
T =
{
X1 for strong inter-generational equity
XP for weak inter-generational equity
(B.9)
B.3. The change in population-average life expectancy conferred
by the safety measure
Two  possible changes in population-average life expectancy, ıX1
and ıXP , may  be considered when calculating the J-value, corre-
sponding to the two population averages discussed immediately
above.
The combination
(
X1, ıX1
)
will give a J-value based on strong
inter-generational equity, while the combination
(
XP, ıXP
)
will
give a J-value corresponding to weak inter-generational equity. The
second J-value will tend to be somewhat lower than the ﬁrst. Mean-
while using the mixed combination
(
X1, ıXP
)
will give a J-value
that is lower than the s¨trongc¨ase.
Appendix C The inappropriateness of the harmonic mean
recommended by Jones-Lee and Chilton
Let A and B be jointly distributed random variables, with
E (A) = A
E (B) = B
(C.1)
The covariance of A and B is deﬁned (e.g. Rice, 2007, Section 4.3)
as the expected value of the product of the deviations of A and B
from their respective means:
cov (A, B) = E ((A  − A) (B − B)) (C.2)
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Expanding the right-hand side of Eq. (C.2) gives:
cov (A, B) = E (AB − AB − BA + AB)
= E (AB) −  E (A)B − E (B)A + AB
= E (AB) −  AB − AB + AB
= E (AB) −  E (A)E (B)
(C.3)
here the distributive property of the expectation operator has
een used in the second line and equation set (C.1) in the third and
ourth. Hence the expectation of the product, AB,  may  be written
s:
(AB) = E (A)E (B) + cov (A, B) (C.4)
In the case where the random variable, B, in Eq. (C.4) is the
eciprocal of a random number, C, the equation may  be written:(
A
C
)
= E (A)E
(
1
C
)
+ cov
(
A,
1
C
)
(C.5)
Jones-Lee and Chilton effectively argue that the term, E
(
1/C
)
,
n Eq. (C.5) can be replaced by 1/H, where H is the harmonic mean.
his is not legitimate, as the reciprocal of the harmonic mean will
ot generally coincide with the expected value, E
(
1/C
)
.
This is because the harmonic mean is deﬁned only for a
nite number, n, of discrete, strictly positive values (Rade and
estergren, 2004), when the reciprocal of H is the arithmetic mean
f the reciprocals, 1/ci, i = 1, 2, . . .,  n :
1
H
= 1
n
(
1
c1
+ 1
c2
+ ... + 1
cn
)
(C.6)
It is clear from Eq. (C.6) that the reciprocal of the harmonic
ean may  be regarded as the expected value, E
(
1/C
)
, only in the
estricted circumstance that the random variable, C, is governed by
 discrete uniform distribution. This could not be the case in the
urrent situation where the denominator of the ratio, viz.  C, would
e a function of age, implying that uniformity could not apply. Put
imply, there are far fewer people aged 95 than there are aged 25.
t would be necessary to use an empirical probability distribution
o account for the differing fractions of people at each age.
Hence the statement by Jones-Lee and Chilton:
F¨urthermore, in the case of a ratio, even if the numerator and
inverse of the denominator are uncorrelated, it is the harmonic
mean of the denominator – rather than the arithmetic mean –
that is required in order to compute the arithmetic mean of the
ratio.(¨their italics)
s incorrect.
ppendix D Worked example: process plant possessing a
ajor accident hazard
Suppose that a chemical plant is to be built close to a small town
n the UK with a steady population of 10,000 citizens. The process
lant is assumed to fall into the COMAH (Control of Major Acci-
ent Hazard) category and it is estimated that 100 people in this
ownship would be killed in the eventuality of a severe accident
ccurring. Such accidents would be rare, but are estimated to occur
ith a frequency of once in a thousand years, implying a probabil-
ty of occurrence in any given year of about 10−3. This imposes an
dditional hazard rate on each person in the community near the
lant of 10−3 × 100 ÷ 10, 000 = 10−5. The plant operator wishes to
educe the frequency of the accident. He can reduce the accident
requency by a factor of 100 by installing a protection system that
ill last for 25 years and has a cost at installation of £9 M and an
nnual maintenance cost of £30,000. The commercial interest rateironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
to which the operator has access is 3% per annum real, that is to say
net of inﬂation. Is this expenditure reasonable?
Discounting the maintenance costs at 3% p.a. over the service
lifetime of 25 years using Eq. (B.6) gives ıVˆN3 = £527,633, so that
the total equivalent cost of the protection system at installation
is £9,527,633, which corresponds to £953 per person. Spreading
payments over the average life expectancy, 41.64 years, of those
living at the time of installation, gives an expenditure, ıGˆ = £33.90
per year. Here the long-term growth of UK GDP per head, 2.03%
p.a. (World Bank, 2017), is used as the social discount rate. The
annual payment of £33.90 corresponds to the assumption of strong
intergenerational equity. The ﬁgure reduces slightly to £30.02 per
year when the life expectancy used, 50.9 years, corresponds to a
population that includes those being born during the service period
of the protection system in addition to those living at the time of
installation – the condition of weak intergenerational equity.
The actuarial calculations are carried out by perturbing the
hazard rate for people of all ages comprising a subset of the UK pop-
ulation based on the latest life tables available, using data from 2014
to 2016 (Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2017). The resulting change to
the hazard rate, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the natural haz-
ard rate, is imposed for the next 25 years of life on people of all
ages. The change in life expectancy is 2.75 days for those living at
the time of installation, 3.28 days for the cohort born after instal-
lation and before the end of the service lifetime and 2.88 days for
the combined group.
Risk-aversion is given by ε = 0.91, as found by Thomas and
Waddington (2017a). Meanwhile GDP per head in 2015 is G = £
29,008 in 2015 £s (Ofﬁce of National Statistics, 2018).
J-values are produced shown in Table 2. These show a small
variation, between 0.51 and 0.58, depending on the assumption
made on intergenerational equity. It all cases, however, J ≤ 1 and
so the protection system represents good value for money.
Appendix E Increase in life expectancy when the hazard rate
is reduced by a uniform amount for longer than one year:
those living at the time of installation
An expression is derived here for the change in life expectancy
for those living at the time of installation of the protection measure.
Assume that a protection system with a service lifetime, TS , is
implemented that reduces the hazard rate by a uniform amount,
b, for the duration of the time it is in service. Consider the people
to be protected who are living at the time the safety measure is
installed. Assuming that there is an ultimate maximum age, ˛0, to
which people may  live, the period of beneﬁt, T (a),  from the safety
system for someone of age, a, will be limited to
T (a) = min (TS, ˛0 − a) (E.1)
The reduction in hazard rate, b (u),  at current and future ages, u,
that people of starting age, a, will experience is thus
b(u) = { bfora < u ≤ a + T(a)
0foru > a + T(a) for a ≥ 0 (E.2)
Before the safety system has been installed, the survival proba-
bility, S ( t| a), to age, t, for someone of age, a, is
tS ( t| a) = S (t)
S (a)
= e
−
∫
u=a
h(u)du
(E.3)
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see e.g. Thomas et al., 2006c, Appendix 1). After the safety system
as been installed, the new survival probability, S′ ( t| a), conditional
n a, will be
S′ ( t| a) = e
−
t∫
u=a
(h (u) − b (u))du
= e
t∫
u=a
b (u)du −
t∫
u=a
h (u)du
= e
t∫
u=a
b (u)du
S ( t| a) = e
t∫
u=a
b (u)du
S (t)
S (a)
(E.4)
he new conditional survival probability may  be used to ﬁnd the
ife expectancy at age, a, after the implementation of the protection
easure as:
′ (a) =
∞∫
t=a
S′ ( t| a)dt =
˛0∫
t=a
S′ ( t| a)dt +
∞∫
t=˛0
0dt =
˛0∫
t=a
S′ ( t| a)dt (E.5)
here the last step follows the assumption that no-one will survive
ast the ultimate maximum, age, ˛0. Substituting from Eq. (E.4) into
q. (E.5) gives:
′ (a) =
˛0∫
t=a
e
t∫
u=a
b(u)du
S (t)
S (a)
dt (E.6)
r
′ (a) = 1
S (a)
˛0∫
t=a
e
t∫
u=a
b(u)du
S (t)dt (E.7)
Considering the term, exp
⎛
⎝ t∫
u=a
b (u)du
⎞
⎠, noting the conditions
f Eq. (E.2) and taking the case where the starting age, a, is low
nough to satisfy a + TS ≤ ˛0, so that the full beneﬁcial period of
he safety measure may  be experienced, the expression will take
he form
t∫
a
b(u)du
= {
e
t∫
a
bdu
= eb(t−a)for future ages,t  : t ≤ a + TS
e
a+TS∫
a
bdu +
t∫
a+TS
0du
= ebTS for future ages,t  : t > a + TS
for a + TS ≤ ˛0 (E.8)Substituting from Eq. (E.8) into Eq. (E.7) gives the modiﬁed life
xpectancy for those living who are young enough to receive the
ull beneﬁt of the safety system:ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328 325
X ′(a) = 1
S(a)
(
a+TS∫
t=a
eb(t−a)S(t)dt +
˛0∫
t=a+TS
ebTS S(t)dt) for a + TS ≤ ˛0
(E.9)
Now consider those people whose ages, a, are high enough to
satisfy a + TS > ˛0. These people are too old to experience the
full beneﬁt of the safety measure, which can beneﬁt them not
over the full service lifetime, TS , but only for the lesser period,
˛0 − a (at most). For these older people, the ﬁrst integral on the
right-hand sided of Eq. (E.9) will have the term, TS , replaced by
˛0 − a, so that the upper limit becomes ˛0. By the same token, the
second integral will disappear. Hence the general expression for
life expectancy at age, a, after the protection measure has been
installed is:
X ′ (a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
S (a)
⎛
⎝a+TS∫
t=a
eb(t−a)S (t)dt +
˛0∫
t=a+TS
ebTS S (t)dt
⎞
⎠ fora ≤ ˛0 − TS
1
S (a)
˛0∫
t=a
eb(t−a)S (t)dt fora > ˛0 − TS
(E.10)
Meanwhile the life expectancy at age, a, without the protection
measure is given by:
X (a) = 1
S (a)
˛0∫
t=a
S (t)dt (E.11)
(cf. Eq. (E.5)). Thus the change in life expectancy, ıX1 (a) = X ′ (a) −
X (a), for someone of age, a, at the time of installation, is given by:
ıX1 (a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
S (a)
⎛
⎝a+TS∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dt +
˛0∫
t=a+TS
(
ebTS − 1
)
S (t)dt
⎞
⎠
fora ≤ ˛0 − TS
1
S (a)
˛0∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dt fora > ˛0 − TS
(E.12)
The change in life expectancy, ıX1, averaged over all ages in the
population will be:
ıX1 =
˛0∫
a=0
fA(a)ıX1(a)da
=
˛0−TS∫
a=0
fA(a)ıX1(a)da +
˛0∫
a=˛0−TS
fA(a)ıX1(a)da
(E.13)
where fA (a) is the probability density for age, a. For a population in
the steady state:
fA (a) =
S (a)
X (0)
(E.14)(see Thomas, 2017c, Appendix B). Substituting from Eq.s (E.12)
and (E.14) into Eq. (E.13) gives the change in life expectancy
for those living at the time of installation of the safety
system:
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X1 = 1
X (0)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
˛o−TS∫
a=0
⎛
⎝a+TS∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dt +
˛0∫
t=a+TS
(
ebTS − 1
)
S (t)dt
⎞
⎠da
+
˛0∫
a=˛o−TS
˛0∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dtda
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(E.15)
or
X1 = 1
X (0)
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
˛o−TS∫
a=0
a+TS∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dtda +
˛o−TS∫
a=0
˛0∫
t=a+TS
(
ebTS − 1
)
S (t)dtda
+
˛0∫
a=˛o−TS
˛0∫
t=a
(
eb(t−a) − 1
)
S (t)dtda
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(E.16)
ppendix F Increase in life expectancy when the hazard rate
s reduced by a uniform amount for longer than one year:
hose born into the protected group during the time the
afety system is in service
Let the change in life expectancy for someone born  years after
he safety measure has been installed be ıX() (0). Let us call 
he b¨irth delay.¨ For a safety system with a service lifetime of TS
ears, someone born immediately after the safety system has been
nstalled will potentially receive beneﬁts for the full TS years, begin-
ing at the age of 0. In this case the change in life expectancy will
e
X(0) (0) = ıX (0) (F.1)
here ıX (0) is the change in life expectancy for a starting age, a, of
ero: ıX (0) = ıX (a)
∣∣
a=0.
Individuals born 1 year after the safety system has been installed
ill accrue beneﬁts over a period of (TS –1) years, again starting at
ge 0. These will lead to a change in life expectancy, ıX(1) (0). Those
orn 2 years after system installation will accrue beneﬁts over (TS
2) years, starting at age 0. They will experience a change in life
xpectancy, ıX(2) (0). This process will continue until we consider
n individual born (TS –1) years after installation, who will have
ust 1 year of beneﬁt starting at age 0. The corresponding change in
ife expectancy will be ıX(TS−1) (0). Meanwhile anyone born TS or
ore years after installation will experience no beneﬁts and hence
o change in life expectancy:
Considering the cohort of the individuals to be born during the
eriod of service of the safety system, their reduction in hazard rate,
(u), at future ages, u, will be
(u) =
{
b for0 < u ≤ TS − 
0 foru > TS − 
(F.2)
The general analysis laid out in Appendix E applies and, speciﬁ-
ally, Eq. (E.7). For the relevant case where the starting age is a  = 0
nd the birth delay is 
t∫ t∫
′() (0) = 1
S (0)
˛0∫
t=0
eu=0
b(u)du
S (t)dt =
˛0∫
t=0
eu=0
b(u)du
S (t)dt (F.3)ironmental Protection 126 (2019) 309–328
since S (0) = 1. Considering the term, exp
⎛
⎝ t∫
u=0
b (u)du
⎞
⎠, applying
the conditions of equation set (F.2) gives
e
t∫
0
b(u)du
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
e
t∫
0
bdu
= ebt for future ages,t : t ≤ TS − 
e
TS−∫
0
bdu +
t∫
TS−
0du
= eb(TS−) for future ages,t : t > TS − 
(F.4)
Partitioning the integral in Eq. (F.3) above and below t = TS − 
and substituting from Eq. (F.4) produces:
X
′() (0) =
TS−∫
t=0
ebtS (t)dt +
˛0∫
t=TS−
eb(TS−)S (t)dt (F.5)
Meanwhile the equivalent life expectancy in the absence of the
safety measure is:
X() (0) =
˛0∫
t=0
S (t)dt =
TS−∫
t=0
S (t)dt +
˛0∫
t=TS−
S (t)dt (F.6)
Subtracting Eq. (F.6) from Eq. (F.5) gives the change in life
expectancy when the birth delay is :
ıX() (0) =
TS−∫
t=0
S (t)
(
ebt − 1
)
dt +
˛0∫
t=TS−
S (t) (eb(TS−) − 1)dt (F.7)
For a steady-state population, the rate of birth will be constant,
and so the probability density for birth delay, fT (), will be uniform
and given by:
fT () =
1
TS
(F.8)
The change in life expectancy, ıX2, for the cohort of those born
during the period of service of the protection system is then found
as:
ıX2 =
1
TS
TS∫
=0
ıX() (0)d (F.9)
or
ıX2 =
1
TS
( TS∫
=0
TS−∫
t=0
S (t)
(
ebt − 1
)
dtd
+
TS∫
=0
˛0∫
t=TS−
(eb(TS−) − 1) S (t)dtd
)
(F.10)
The overall average change of life expectancy, ıXP , for the pro-
tected group is then given by (Thomas et al., 2006c):
ıXP =
X (0) ıX1 + TSıX2
X (0) + TS
(F.11)
Appendix G The Total Judgement or JT-valueJones-Lee and Chilton (2017) devote the ﬁnal paragraph of their
Section 5 to a statement on the JT-value (which they are incorrect
to suggest applies only to nuclear hazards):
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"However, it is important to appreciate the fact that since envi-
ronmental effects would be dealt with quite separately from
effects on health and safety in a conventional cost-beneﬁt anal-
ysis of the type carried out by UK Government departments,
such effects should not be treated as constituting part of the
VPF implied by the Thomas model in any legitimate comparison
with the DfT ﬁgure."
his seems to be a simple assertion of the belief held by Jones-Lee
nd Chilton. It appears also to embody Fallacy 2.3, the erroneous
ssumption that the J-value is designed to ﬁnd an improved VPF
gure.
Notably those authors fail to provide evidence that they have
ead the papers of record on the Total Judgement- or JT-value
Thomas et al., 2010b, c, Thomas and Jones, 2010). In fact, the JT-
alue provides an objective answer on how much ought to be spent
n safeguards when there is a need to protect both humans and the
nvironment from harm.
While human harm may  be the predominant risk in some cases,
here are other instances where an industrial protection system
ill need to be designed to mitigate against economic and envi-
onmental costs in addition. For example a shut-down system on
 chemical plant or a nuclear reactor will protect against not only
uman harm but also damage to nearby plant and the spread of
ontamination to the environment. The BP Macondo/ Deepwater
orizon explosion and oil spill of 2010 is a prime recent exam-
le where a very bad accident on an oil and gas process plant led
oth to the loss of human life and to major environmental and eco-
omic harm. A properly functioning protection system would have
afeguarded against both effects.
Assigning the umbrella term, e¨nvironmental costs,¨ to cover the
osts associated with environmental clean-up, evacuation of peo-
le, loss of business, damage to plant and damage to reputation,
he trade-off between extra spending on the protection system and
hese environmental costs may  be quantiﬁed using an extension to
tility theory to produce a second Judgement Value, J20. The result
s then integrated with the J-value to produce the Total Judgement
r JT-value, which will indicate whether the total cost of the pro-
ection system is reasonable in view of its ability to protect both
umans and the environment. A feature common to J, J20 and JT is
hat each is fully objective.
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